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Abstract
This paper examines two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (a firm
or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In
a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a single hospital, a hospital has a
maximum quota; thus, the number of doctors assigned to that hospital cannot exceed a certain
limit. In our model, in contrast, a hospital instead has a fixed budget; that is, the total amount
of wages allocated by each hospital to the doctors is constrained. With budget constraints,
stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the existence is hard. To deal with the
nonexistence of stable matchings, we extend the “matching with contracts” model of Hatfield
and Milgrom, so that it deals with near-feasible matchings that exceed each hospital budget
by a certain amount. We then propose two novel mechanisms that efficiently return such a
near-feasible matching that is stable with respect to the actual amount of wages allocated by
each hospital. Specifically, by sacrificing strategy-proofness, our second mechanism achieves
the best possible bound of budget excess.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a two-sided, one-to-many matching model where there are budget constraints on
one side (a firm or hospital), that is, the total amount of wages that it can pay to the other side (a
worker or doctor) is limited. The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed, as
is illustrated by the comprehensive surveys of Roth and Sotomayor [34] or Manlove [29]. Rather
than fixed budgets, maximum quotas limiting the total number of doctors that each hospital can
hire are typically used. Some real-world examples are subject to the matching problem with budget
constraints: a college can offer stipends to recruit better students when the budget for admission is
limited; a firm can offer wages to workers under the condition that employment costs depend on
earnings in the previous accounting period; a public hospital can offer salaries to doctors in the case
where the total amount relies on funds from the government; and so on. To establish our model and
concepts, we use doctor-hospital matching as a running example.
To date, most papers on matching with monetary transfers assume that budgets are unrestricted,
e.g., [24]. When they are restricted, stable matchings may fail to exist [31, 2]. In fact, Abizada [2]
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considers a subtly different model from ours and shows that (coalitional) stable matchings, where
groups of doctors and hospitals have no profitable deviations, may not exist.
There are several possibilities to circumvent the nonexistence problem. Abizada [2] modifies
the notion of stability and proposes a variant of the deferred acceptance mechanism that produces a
pairwise, instead of coalitional, stable matching, and is strategy-proof for doctors. Dean, Goemans,
and Immorlica [9] examine a problem similar to ours, restricting each hospital to having only
a lexicographic utility. We instead allow each hospital to have an additive utility. Nguyen and
Vohra [32] examine matchings with couples where joint preference lists over pairs of hospitals
are submitted, e.g., [27, 33]. They then develop an algorithm that outputs a near-feasible stable
matching, in which the number of doctors assigned to each hospital differs (up or down) from the
actual maximum quota by at most three.
We focus on near-feasible matchings on a different model from Nguyen and Vohra [32] that
exceeds the budget of each hospital by a certain amount. This idea can be interpreted as one in
which, for each instance of a matching problem, our mechanisms find a “nearby” instance with
a stable matching. However, it must be emphasized that Nguyen and Vohra discuss no strategic
issue, i.e., misreporting a doctor’s preference may be profitable. The literature on matching has
found strategy-proofness for doctors, that is, no doctor has an incentive to misreport his or her
preference, to be a key property in a wide variety of settings [1].
The stability and strategy-proofness on matching mechanisms with/without monetary transfers
is characterized by the generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism on a “matching with con-
tracts” model [18]. When budgets are unrestricted, if a mechanism—the choice function of every
hospital—satisfies three properties, specifically, substitutability, irrelevance of rejected contracts,
and law of aggregate demand, then it always finds a “stable” allocation and is strategy-proof for
doctors. What happens if they are restricted? No choice function that chooses the most preferred
contracts can satisfy these three properties simultaneously since no stable matching may exist in
the first place. Therefore, we treat the hospital budget constraints as “soft” and characterize the
stability and strategy-proofness on near-feasible matching mechanisms.
Our first contribution is extending the matching with contract framework so that it can handle
a situation where no conventional stable matching may exist. We identify the sufficient conditions
for choice functions so that, for any instance of matching problems with budget constraints, there
is a nearby instance guaranteed to have a stable matching. Even if a choice function that produces
a near-feasible matching satisfies substitutability and irrelevance of rejected contracts, the resulting
matching is not always stable. This is because these two properties are not sufficient to ensure
the optimality of hospital utilities. Therefore, we devise a new additional property, which we call
compatibility, on the matching with contract model.
Moreover, from a practical point of view, we need to compute choice functions efficiently. How-
ever, computing each hospital’s choice function in our setting is NP-hard because it is equivalent to
solving a knapsack problem. In fact, McDermid and Manlove [30] consider matchings with insep-
arable couples in which two doctors of each couple must be assigned to the same hospital. Their
model is contained in ours as a special case. They prove that deciding whether a stable matching ex-
ists or not is NP-hard (Non-deterministic Polynomial-time hard). In contrast, the choice functions
we develop can be implemented to run fast via consulting Dantzig’s greedy algorithm [8].
Building upon these ideas, our second contribution is two mechanisms that can be implemented
2
to run fast: one is strategy-proof for doctors and the other is not. Our first mechanism outputs a
stable matching that exceeds each budget by a factor at most the maximum wage each hospital
offers over the minimum one. Our second mechanism, by sacrificing strategy-proofness, improves
the violation bound; that is, it produces a stable matching that exceeds each budget up to the
maximum wage each hospital offers. This is the best possible bound. Furthermore, we find two
special cases such that a slight modification of the second mechanism recovers strategy-proofness,
keeping the best possible bound.
Our model assumes that the amount of predefined budgets is flexible up to a certain amount.
There is certainly some realistic situation where this assumption is justified. Indeed, in firm-worker
matchings, if a firm receives an application from a worker who is appropriate for the business, the
CEO would agree to increase the employment cost. In doctor-hospital matchings, hospitals can
create an association that pools funds in advance and subsidizes the expense of salaries according
to matching results. Even when budgets must not be exceeded, our mechanisms can work by
decreasing budgets in a certain amount in advance. Our second mechanism produces a near-feasible
matching that does not exceed the predefined budgets.
Alternatively, our model can handle a matching problem with inseparable couples, as was stud-
ied by McDermid and Manlove [30]. In this problem, there are single doctors and couples. Each
single doctor and couple has a preference over hospitals and each hospital has a maximum quota.
We can consider this problem as ours with just two possible wages, e.g., 1 or 2, and budgets cor-
responding to maximum quotas. Our second mechanism outputs a stable matching that exceeds
each maximum quota up to 1. Notice that the matching mechanism of Nguyen and Vohra [32]
is not easily extended to our setting since it is designed for separable couples. Even if it could
be extended, their mechanism is computationally hard because it relies on Scarf’s Lemma, whose
computational version is PPAD-complete [25] (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs).
Thus, the mechanism is unlikely to be implemented to run fast, particularly when many possible
contracts are offered.
Let us briefly explore some related literature. Matching with constraints is prominent across
computer science and economics [21]. In many application domains, various distributional con-
straints are often imposed on an outcome, e.g., regional maximum quotas are imposed on hospitals
in urban areas to allocate more doctors to rural areas [20] or minimum quotas are imposed when
school districts require that at least a certain number of students are allocated to each school to
enable these school to operate properly [4, 13, 14]. Yet another type of distributional constraint
involves diversity constraints in school choice programs [1, 26, 16, 12]. They are implemented to
give students/parents an opportunity to choose which public school to attend. However, a school is
required to balance its composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status. Con-
trolled school choice programs must provide choices while maintaining distributional constraints.
Finally, note that there is a certain amount of recent studies on two-sided matchings in the AI
(Artificial Intelligence) and multi-agent systems community, although this literature has been es-
tablished in the field across algorithms and economics. Drummond and Boutilier [10, 11] examine
preference elicitation procedures for two-sided matching. In the context of mechanism design,
Hosseini, Larson, and Cohen [19] consider a mechanism for a situation in which agent preferences
dynamically change. Kurata et al. [28] explore strategy-proof mechanisms for affirmative action in
school choice programs (diversity constraints), while Goto et al. [15] handle regional constraints,
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e.g., imposing regional minimum/maximum quotas on hospitals in urban areas so that more doctors
are allocated to rural areas.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we set forth the notations and
basic concepts for our two-sided matching model. Section 3 provides impossibility and intractabil-
ity results and Section 4 introduces a new property for when each hospital faces a budget constraint.
Section 5 develops two mechanisms that can be implemented to run fast: one is strategy-proof for
doctors and the other is not. We further examine two special cases such that a slight modification
of the second mechanism recovers strategy-proofness, while maintaining the best possible bound.
Finally, we present our conclusion in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
This section describes a model for two-sided matchings with budget constraints. A market is a
tuple (D,H,X,D, fH , BH), where each component is defined as follows: There is a finite set of
doctors D = {d1, . . . , dn} and a finite set of hospitals H = {h1, . . . , hm}. Let X ⊆ D×H ×R++
denote a finite set of contracts, where each contract x ∈ X is of the form x = (d, h, w). Here, R++
is the set of positive real numbers. A contract means that hospital h ∈ H offers wage w ∈ R++
to doctor d. A hospital can choose a wage freely within R++ and can offer a doctor multiple
contracts with different wages. Each contract is acceptable for each hospital h. Furthermore, for
any subset of contracts X ′ ⊆ X , let X ′d denote {(d′, h′, w′) ∈ X ′ | d′ = d} and X ′h denote
{(d′, h′, w′) ∈ X ′ | h′ = h}. We use the notations xD, xH , and xW to describe the doctor, the
hospital, and the wage associated with a contract x ∈ X , respectively.
Let D= (d)d∈D denote the doctors’ preference profile, where d is the strict relation of d ∈
D overXd∪{∅}, that is, x d x′ means that d strictly prefers x to x′. ∅ indicates a null contract. Let
fH = (fh)h∈H denote the hospital utility profile, where fh : Xh → R++ is a function such that for
any two sets of contractsX ′, X ′′ ⊆ Xh, hospital h prefersX ′ toX ′′ if and only if fh(X ′) > fh(X ′′)
holds. We further assume that fh is additive for all h ∈ H , i.e., fh(X ′) =
∑
x∈X′ fh(x) holds for
any X ′ ⊆ Xh. We assume cardinal utilities, instead of priority orderings, as used in some previous
works [3, 5, 6]. However, this does not matter for our theoretical results. Indeed, a cardinal utility
can be transformed into a priority ordering h over contracts Xh for each hospital h ∈ H , where,
for any two contracts x, x′ ∈ Xh, x h x′ if and only if fh(x) > fh(x′).
Each hospital h has a fixed budget Bh ∈ R++ that it can distribute as wages to its admitted
doctors. Let BH = (Bh)h∈H be the budget profile. We assume that, for any contract (d, h, w),
0 < w ≤ Bh holds. Given X , let
wh = min
x∈Xh
xW and wh = max
x∈Xh
xW .
Moreover, we use the notation wh(X ′) for any X ′ ⊆ X to denote the total wage that h offers in X ′,
i.e.,
∑
x∈X′h xW .
We call a subset of contractsX ′ ⊆ X a matching if |X ′d| ≤ 1 for all d ∈ D. A matchingX ′ ⊆ X
is B′H-feasible if wh(X
′) ≤ B′h for all h ∈ H . Given a matching X ′, another matching X ′′ ⊆ Xh
for hospital h is a blocking set (or coalition) if X ′′ xD X ′ for all doctors xD of x ∈ X ′′ \ X ′,
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fh(X
′′) > fh(X ′h), and wh(X
′′) ≤ B′h. If such X ′′ exists, we say X ′′ blocks X ′. Then we obtain a
stability concept.
Definition 1 (B′H-stability). We say a matching X ′ is B′H-stable if it is B′H-feasible and there exists
no blocking coalition.
As we will see, when no hospital is allowed to violate the given constraints BH , conventional
stable matchings (B′H = BH) may not exist. Definition 1, for example, allows a central planner to
add or redistribute the budgets and this planner finds a problem instance with B′H(≥ BH), whose
B′H-stable matching is guaranteed to exist. If each contract has the same amount of wage w, we
can regard a budget constraint Bh for each hospital h as its maximum quota of bBh/wc. Note also
that a matching X ′ ⊆ X is doctor-optimal if X ′d d X ′′d for all d ∈ D and all X ′′ ⊆ X .
A mechanism is a function that takes a profile of doctor preferences as input and returns match-
ing X ′. We say a mechanism is stable if it always produces a B′H-stable matching for certain
B′H . We also say a mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if no doctor ever has any incentive to
misreport her preference, regardless of what the other doctors report.
Next, we briefly describe a class of mechanisms called the generalized DA mechanism [18]
and its properties. This mechanism uses choice functions ChD : 2X → 2X and ChH : 2X → 2X .
For each doctor d, its choice function Chd(X ′) chooses {x}, where x = (d, h, w) ∈ X ′d such that
x is the most preferred contract within X ′d (we assume Chd(X
′) = ∅ if ∅ d x for all x ∈ X ′d).
Then, the choice function of all doctors is given as: ChD(X ′) :=
⋃
d∈D Chd(X
′
d). Similarly, the
choice function of all hospitals ChH(X ′) is
⋃
h∈H Chh(X
′
h), where Chh is a choice function of
h. There are alternative ways to define the choice function of each hospital Chh. As we discuss
later, the mechanisms considered in this paper are expressed by the generalized DA with different
formulations of ChH . Formally, the generalized DA is given as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Generalized DA
input: X,ChD,ChH output: matching X ′ ⊆ X
1 R(0) ← ∅;
2 for i = 1, 2, . . . do
3 Y (i) ← ChD(X \R(i−1)), Z(i) ← ChH(Y (i));
4 R(i) ← R(i−1) ∪ (Y (i) \ Z(i));
5 if Y (i) = Z(i) then return Y (i);
Here, R(i) is a set of rejected contracts at the ith iteration. Doctors cannot choose contracts in R(i).
Initially, R(0) is empty. Thus, each doctor can choose her most preferred contract. The chosen
set by doctors is Y (i). Hospitals then choose Z(i), which is a subset of Y (i). If Y (i) = Z(i), i.e.,
no contract is rejected by the hospitals, the mechanism terminates. Otherwise, it updates R(i) and
repeats the same procedure.
Hatfield and Milgrom [18] define a notion of stability, which we refer to as HM-stability.
Definition 2. (HM-STABILITY) A matching X ′ ⊆ X is said to be HM-stable if (i) X ′ satisfies
X ′ = ChD(X ′) = ChH(X ′) and (ii) there is no hospital h and set of contracts X ′′ 6= Chh(X ′h)
such that X ′′ = Chh(X ′h ∪X ′′) ⊆ ChD(X ′ ∪X ′′).
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HM-stability unifies stability concepts that are designed for each context of (standard) matching
problems without constraints. Indeed, it implies BH-stability if we require the choice functions of
hospitals to strictly satisfy budget constraints BH . Let us next observe the properties for ChH .
Definition 3. (SUBSTITUTABILITY, SUB) For any X ′, X ′′ ⊆ X with X ′′ ⊆ X ′, X ′′ \ChH(X ′′) ⊆
X ′ \ChH(X ′). Specifically, this property requires that if contract x is rejected in X ′′, then it is also
rejected when more contracts are added to X ′′.
Definition 4. (IRRELEVANCE OF REJECTED CONTRACTS, IRC) For any X ′ ⊆ X and X ′′ ⊆
X \ X ′, ChH(X ′) = ChH(X ′ ∪ X ′′) holds if ChH(X ′ ∪ X ′′) ⊆ X ′. Thus, this property requires
that, when adding x to X ′, if x is not accepted, then x does not affect the outcomes of other
contracts in X ′.
Definition 5. (LAW OF AGGREGATE DEMAND, LAD) For any X ′, X ′′ with X ′′ ⊆ X ′ ⊆ X ,
|ChH(X ′′)| ≤ |ChH(X ′)|. In other words, this property requires that the number of accepted
contracts increases weakly when more contracts are added.
Hatfield and Milgrom [18] proved that, if ChH satisfies SUB and IRC, the generalized DA
always produces a matching that is HM-stable. If ChH further satisfies LAD, it is strategy-proof
for doctors.
3 Impossibility and Intractability
When no hospital is allowed to violate the given constraints, stable matchings may not exist [31,
30, 2].
For clarity, let us describe an example in which no stable matching exists in our model.
Example 1. Consider a market with three doctors D = {d1, d2, d3} and two hospitals H =
{h1, h2}. Hospital h1 offers wage 9, e.g., nine hundred thousand dollars, to doctor d1, and 6
and 4 to d2 and d3, while h2 offers 6 and 4 to d2 and d3, respectively. Then, the set of offered
contracts X is
{(d1, h1, 9), (d2, h1, 6), (d3, h1, 4), (d2, h2, 6), (d3, h2, 4)}.
The doctors’ preferences are given as follows:
d1 : (d1, h1, 9),
d2 : (d2, h1, 6) d2 (d2, h2, 6),
d3 : (d3, h2, 4) d3 (d3, h1, 4).
Next, each hospital utility is given from the amount of wages. For example, doctor d2 prefers
contract (d2, h1, 6) to (d2, h2, 6). Hospital h1 has the utility of 9, 6, and 4 for (d1, h1, 9), (d2, h1, 6),
and (d3, h1, 4), respectively, that is,
fh1({(d1, h1, 9)}) = 9, fh1({(d2, h1, 6)}) = 6, and fh1({(d3, h1, 4)}) = 4.
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For each single contract, hospital h1 prefers (d1, h1, 9) to (d2, h1, 6) to (d3, h1, 4). Hospital h2 has
the utility function fh2 such that fh2({(d2, h2, 6)}) = 6 and fh2({(d3, h2, 4)}) = 4. Finally, hospital
h1 has a fixed budget of Bh1 = 10 and h2 has Bh2 = 6.
We claim that there exists no BH-stable matching in this situation. First, assume d1 is assigned
to h1 with wage 9. No more doctors are assigned to this hospital due to the budget constraint. If
d2 is assigned to h2, {(d2, h1, 6), (d3, h1, 4)} is a blocking coalition because d2 prefers h1 to h2,
d3 prefers h1 to being unmatched, and h1 prefers {(d2, h1, 6), (d3, h1, 4)} to {(d1, h1, 9)}. If d3 is
assigned to h2, (d2, h2, 6) blocks this matching.
Second, assume d1 is not assigned to h1. If d2 and d3 are simultaneously assigned to h1, d3
prefers h2 to h1 and h2 prefers d3 to being unmatched. If they are assigned to different hospitals,
respectively, (d1, h1, 9) blocks this matching regardless of which doctor is assigned to h1. For the
remaining cases, since either hospital is being unmatched, some contract or coalition always blocks
the matching.
Note that fh({(d, h, w)}) = w holds for any (d, h, w) ∈ X in the above example. Thus, stable
matching may not exist even when the utility of each hospital over a set of contracts is the total
amount of their wages.
This raises the issue of the complexity of deciding the existence of a BH-stable matching.
McDermid and Manlove [30] considered a special case of our model and proved NP-hardness.
Hamada et al. [17] examined a similar model to ours and Abizada’s [2] and proved that the existence
problem is ΣP2 -complete.
To deal with the nonexistence of stable matchings, we focus on a near-feasible matching that
exceeds each budget by a certain amount. For each instance of a matching problem, our mecha-
nisms find a nearby instance with a stable matching. The following theorem implies that, to obtain
a stable matching, at least one hospital h needs to increase its budget by nearly wh.
Theorem 1. For any positive reals α < β < 1, there exists a market (D,H,X,D, fH , BH) such
that wh ≤ β · Bh and no stable matching exists in any inflated market (D,H,X,D, fH , B′H) if
Bh ≤ B′h ≤ (1 + α)Bh for all h ∈ H .
Proof. Let m be a positive integer larger than 1/(β − α) + 1/(1− β). We consider a market with
m2 doctors
D = {d∗, d01, . . . , dm1 , d02, . . . , dm2 , . . . , d0m−1, . . . , dmm−1}
and m hospitals H = {h1, h2, . . . , hm}. Figure 1 illustrates the market with some doctors’ prefer-
ences and hospitals’ utilities. The set of offered contracts is a union of
Xd∗ = {(d∗, hm, β)},
Xd0i = {(d0i , hm, 1/m), (d0i , hi, β)} for all i ∈ [m− 1],
Xdji
= {(dji , hi, 1−βm−1)} for all i, j ∈ [m− 1], and
Xdmi = {(dmi , hi, β), (dmi , hm, 1/m)} for all i ∈ [m− 1],
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where [m− 1] indicates {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}. We assume that the preferences of the doctors are
d∗ : (d∗, hm, β),
d0i : (d0i , hm, 1/m) d0i (d0i , hi, β) for all i ∈ [m− 1],
dji : (d
j
i , hi,
1−β
m−1) for all i, j ∈ [m− 1], and
dmi : (dmi , hi, β) dmi (dmi , hm, 1/m) for all i ∈ [m− 1].
The utilities of each hospital are
fhm((d
∗, hm, β)) = 1,
fhm((d
0
i , hm, 1/m)) = 2
−i for all i ∈ [m− 1],
fhi((d
0
i , hi, β)) = 2
m for all i ∈ [m− 1],
fhi((d
j
i , hi,
1−β
m−1)) = 2
m−j for all i, j ∈ [m− 1],
fhi((d
m
i , hi, β)) = 1 for all i ∈ [m− 1], and
fhm((d
m
i , hm, 1/m)) = 2
m−i for all i ∈ [m− 1].
Every hospital has the fixed budget 1 (Bh1 = · · · = Bhm = 1). The condition wh ≤ β · Bh holds
since 1/m ≤ β = β ·Bh and (1− β)/(m− 1) ≤ β = β ·Bh. The market (D,H,X,D, fH , BH)
is depicted in Figure 1.
We are going to show that there is no B′H-stable matching such that Bh ≤ B′h ≤ (1 + α) · Bh
for all h ∈ H by contradiction. Let us assume that X ′ is a B′H-stable matching, namely, a stable
matching for a market (D,H,X,D, fH , B′H) such that Bh ≤ B′h ≤ (1 + α)Bh for all h ∈ H .
First, let us consider a case where, for all i ∈ [m − 1], doctor d0i is assigned to hm with 1/m,
i.e.,
Y 0m ≡ {(d01, hm, 1/m), . . . , (d0m−1, hm, 1/m)} ⊆ X ′.
In this case, d∗ must be assigned to hm because we assume X ′ is B′H-stable. Specifically, doctor
d∗ prefers hm to being unmatched. Hospital hm prefers the contract with d∗, whose utility is one,
to Y 0m, whose utility is
∑m−1
i=1 2
−i. In addition, the wage to d∗, that is, β, is smaller than the total
wages to Y 0m, that is, (m−1)/m. Thus, unless d∗ is assigned to hm with β, she can form a blocking
coalition. Since X ′ contains at least (d∗, hm, β) and Y 0m, we derive
whm(X
′) ≥ β + (m− 1)/m
> 1 + β − (β − α)(1− β)
1− α
> (1 + β)− (β − α) = (1 + α)
from the assumptions of m, α, and β. Thus, whm(X ′) is strictly greater than (1 + α)Bhm , contra-
dicting that X ′ is B′H-feasible, which is implied by B
′
H-stability.
Second, let us consider another case where, for some i ∈ [m− 1], d0i is not assigned to hm, i.e.,
Y 0m 6⊆ X ′. In this case, d0i must be assigned to hi. To illustrate this, it is sufficient to consider a
situation where (dmi , hi, β) and
Yi ≡ {(d1i , hi, 1−βm−1), . . . , (dm−1i , hi, 1−βm−1)}
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d01 ...
dm1
...
d0i(d
0
i , hm, 1/m) d0i (d0i , hi, β) ...
dji(d
j
i , hi,
1−β
m−1) ...
dmi(d
m
i , hi, β) dmi (dmi , hm, 1/m)
...
d0m−1 ...
dmm−1
d∗(d∗, hm, β)
h1
Bh1 = 1
...
hi
Bhi = 1
fhi((d
0
i , hi, β)) = 2
m
fhi((d
j
i , hi,
1−β
m−1)) = 2
m−j (j ∈ [m− 1])
fhi((d
m
i , hi, β)) = 1
...
hm−1
Bhm−1 = 1
hm
Bhm = 1
fhm((d
m
i , hm, 1/m)) = 2
m−i (i ∈ [m− 1])
fhm((d
∗, hm, β)) = 1
fhm((d
0
i , hm, 1/m)) = 2
−i (i ∈ [m− 1])
Figure 1: Example of a market with no B′H-stable matching such that Bh ≤ B′h ≤ (1 + α) ·Bh for
all h ∈ H .
are chosen by hi, i.e., {(dmi , hi, β)}∪Yi ⊆ X ′. Hospital hi obtains the utility of 1+
∑m−1
i=1 2
m−i (=
2m − 1) on the assignment. On the other hand, if d0i is assigned to hi with β, hi obtains the utility
of 2m. Evidently, hi prefers (d0i , hi, β) to {(dmi , hi, β)} ∪ Yi and d0i can form a blocking coalition
unless she is assigned to hi. To consider a set of doctors who are not assigned to hm, we introduce
a set of indexes
I = {i ∈ [m− 1] | (d0i , hm, 1/m) 6∈ X ′}.
By the assumption, I is not the empty set. In what follows, we concentrate on matchings where
doctor d0i , for all i ∈ I , is assigned to hi instead of hm. Note that dmi for i ∈ [m − 1] \ I
must be assigned to hi because, if dmi is not assigned to hi, {(dmi , hi, β)} ∪ Yi is a blocking
coalition. In addition, dmi for i ∈ I must be assigned to hi or hm because, if dmi is unmatched,
Xh \ {(d∗, hm, β)} ∪ {(dmi , hm, 1/m)} is a blocking coalition.
Let us first examine a case where, for all i ∈ I , dmi are assigned to hm. In this case, d∗ must be
assigned to hm. Unless d∗ is assigned to hm, X ′′ = X ′hm ∪ {(d0i , hm, 1/m)} is a blocking coalition
for i ∈ I . This is because d0i prefers hm the most and whm(X ′′) = 1. Then, since X ′hm contains
{(d0i , hm, 1/m) | i ∈ [m− 1] \ I}, {(dmi , hm, 1/m) | i ∈ I}, and (d∗, hm, β),
we derive whm(X ′) = (m − 1)/m + β, which is strictly greater than 1 + α from the assumptions
of m, α, and β. Thus, whm(X ′) is strictly greater than (1 + α)Bhm , which contradicts that X ′ is
B′H-stable.
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Next, let us examine another case where, for some i ∈ I , doctor dmi is assigned to hi. In
this case, Yi must be chosen by hi because, if d
j
i is not assigned to hi for some j ∈ [m − 1],
X ′hi \ {(dmi , hi, β)} ∪ {(dji , hi, 1−βm−1)} is a blocking coalition. In fact, doctor dji prefers hi to being
unmatched. Hospital hi prefers (d
j
i , hi,
1−β
m−1), whose utility is 2
m−j (≥ 2), to (dmi , hi, β), whose
utility is 1. In addition, the wage to dji , that is,
1−β
m−1 , is smaller than the wage to d
m
i , that is, β. Then,
since X ′hi contains (d
0
i , hi, β), (d
m
i , hi, β), and Yi, we derive whi(X
′) = 1 + β > 1 + α from the
assumptions of m, α, and β. Thus, whi(X
′) is strictly greater than (1 + α)Bhi , contradicting that
X ′ is B′H-stable.
4 New Property: Compatibility
This section introduces a new property, which we call compatibility, to extend Hatfield and Mil-
grom’s framework for a situation in which budget constraints may be violated. Let us first consider
the following choice function for a hospital h:
Ch∗h(X
′) = arg max
X′′⊆X′, wh(X′′)≤Bh
fh(X
′′)
for each X ′ ⊆ Xh.1 Evaluating Ch∗h is computationally hard because the problem is equivalent to
the well-known knapsack problem, which is an NP-hard problem (see e.g., [23]). Even worse, the
generalized DA does not always produce a BH-stable matching because such a matching need not
exist. Furthermore, even if there exists aBH-stable matching, it may produce an unstable matching.
Accordingly, it is neither practical nor reasonable that we require choice functions to satisfy budget
constraints.
What choice function Chh can we construct when we allow it to violate budget constraints?
Strategy-proofness is still characterized by SUB, IRC, and LAD because changing the budgets of
hospitals does not affect doctor preferences. However, SUB and IRC are not sufficient to admit a
stable matching in our sense.
Intuitively, to admit such a stable matching, the set of contracts chosen by the choice function
maximize the hospital’s utility. Otherwise, a hospital with non-optimal utility can form a blocking
coalition. To prevent this, we need to introduce a new property.
Definition 6. (COMPATIBILITY, COM) Consider a hospital h with a utility function fh, a budget
Bh, and contracts Xh. For any X ′′ ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Xh such that wh(X ′′) ≤ max{Bh, wh(Chh(X ′))}, it
holds that
fh(Chh(X
′)) ≥ fh(X ′′).
With this property, the output of the choice function Chh is guaranteed to be the optimal solu-
tion for a knapsack problem with a certain capacity that is greater than or equal to the predefined
capacity.
We next prove that COM together with SUB and IRC characterizes stable matchings when
budget constraints may be violated.
1When ties occur in the argmax above, we break ties arbitrarily, for example, by choosing the lexicographically
smallest one with respect to a fixed order of doctors.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that for every hospital the choice function satisfies SUB, IRC, and COM. The
generalized DA produces a matching X ′ that is B′H-stable, where B
′
H = (max{Bh, wh(X ′)})h∈H .
Proof. Let the mechanism terminate at the lth iteration, i.e., X ′ = Y (l) = Z(l). From its definition,
it is immediately derived that the union of Y (i) and R(i) is nondecreasing in i(≤ l); i.e., for any
i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , l},
Y (i) ∪R(i) ⊇ Y (i−1) ∪R(i−1). (1)
For notational simplicity, we refer to Y (i) ∪R(i) as T (i).
Next, to obtain ChH(X ′ ∪ R(l)) = X ′ for any X ′, we claim that ChH(T (i)) = Z(i) for any
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}. For the base case i = 1, we have ChH(T (1)) = ChH(Y (1)) = Z(1) since
R(1) = Y (1) \ Z(1) ⊆ Y (1). For the general case i > 1, we suppose ChH(T (i−1)) = Z(i−1).
From (1), we rewrite the SUB condition as T (i−1) \ ChH(T (i−1)) ⊆ T (i) \ ChH(T (i)). By the
inductive hypothesis, we transform the left side of the equation (Y (i−1) ∪R(i−1)) \ Z(i−1) to
(R(i−1) \ Z(i−1)) ∪ (Y (i−1) \ Z(i−1)) = R(i−2) ∪ (Y (i−1) \ Z(i−1)) = R(i−1).
Hence, it holds that R(i−1) ⊆ T (i) \ ChH(T (i)) and thus ChH(T (i)) includes no contract in R(i−1).
Together with the IRC condition, ChH(T (i)) is equal to
ChH(T
(i) \R(i−1)) = ChH((Y (i) ∪R(i)) \R(i−1))
= ChH((Y
(i) ∪R(i−1)) \R(i−1)) = ChH(Y (i)) = Z(i).
The third equality holds because Y (i) ∩ R(i−1) = ∅ and Y (i) ∪ R(i) = Y (i) ∪ (R(i−1) ∪ (Y (i) \
Z(i))) = Y (i) ∪ R(i−1). Consequently, we obtain the claim and, since X ′ = Y (l) = Z(l), we get
ChH(X
′ ∪R(l)) = X ′.
Next, since Chh is COM, fh(Chh(X ′h ∪ R(l)h )) ≥ fh(X ′′) holds for any X ′′ ⊆ X ′h ∪ R(l)h such
that wh(X ′′) ≤ max{Bh, wh(Chh(X ′h ∪ R(l)h ))}. Here, as Chh(X ′h ∪ R(l)h ) = X ′h, fh(Chh(X ′h)) ≥
fh(X
′′) holds for any X ′′ ⊆ X ′h ∪R(l)h such that wh(X ′′) ≤ B′h.
Suppose, contrary to our claim, that X ′′ ⊆ Xh is a blocking coalition for a hospital h. By the
definition of a blocking coalition, (i) X ′′ xD X ′ for all x ∈ X ′′, (ii) fh(X ′′) > fh(X ′h), and (iii)
wh(X
′′) ≤ B′h. The condition (i) implies x ∈ X ′ ∪R(l) for all x ∈ X ′′ and, hence, X ′′ ⊆ X ′h ∪R(l)h
holds. This contradicts the fact that ChH(X ′ ∪ R(l)) = X ′ for any X ′. Therefore, X ′ is B′H-stable
where B′H = (max{Bh, wh(X ′)})h∈H .
Note that this theorem does not specify how much a hospital may exceed its budget. Here,
one can define a choice function such that the hospital can afford to hire all of the doctors who
have accepted its contracts far beyond the predefined budgets. The theorem simply ensures that if a
choice function satisfies COM, in addition to SUB and IRC, the generalized DA admits aB′H-stable
matching X ′ with B′h = max{Bh, wh(X ′)} for each hospital.
We also point out that, if each hospital h knows the selectable contracts, i.e., Y (l)h ∪ R(l)h , in
advance, it only needs to select arg max{fh(X ′′) | X ′′ ⊆ X ′h ∪ R(l)h , wh(X ′′) ≤ B′h} for a certain
budget B′h (≥ Bh). However, the selectable contracts are difficult to predict because the resulting
set depends on the choice function itself. Designing or finding a choice function that satisfies the
required properties and only violates budget constraints to an acceptable extent is not straightfor-
ward.
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5 Near-Feasible Stable Mechanisms
In matching with constraints [20, 15, 28], designing a desirable mechanism essentially tailors
choice functions for hospitals to satisfy necessary properties and constraints simultaneously. We
tackle this challenging task as an analogue to approximation or online algorithms for knapsack
problems.
Let us start from Dantzig’s greedy algorithm for fractional knapsack problems [8]. This algo-
rithm greedily selects contracts with respect to utility per unit wage and then outputs an optimal
but fractional solution. We need to develop an algorithm that always provides an integral solution.
Roughly speaking, we must provide an algorithm (choice function) that satisfies the necessary prop-
erties, e.g., SUB and COM, for any set of contracts X ′ given at each round of the generalized DA.
At the same time, we need to let the algorithm determine how much budget should be exceeded
beyond the predefined amount (how many contracts should be chosen). Indeed, at each round, it is
difficult to predict the amount of over-budget excess without violating the necessary properties. In
what follows, we propose two choice functions that adaptively specify how much budgets should
be spent within the generalized DA process.
5.1 Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes a strategy-proof mechanism that outputs a matching X ′ that is B′H-stable,
whereB′h is at mostwh ·dBh/whe for any h ∈ H . Let kh = dBh/whe. The choice function greedily
takes the top min{kh, |X ′|} contracts according to the utility per unit wage. Formally, it is given as
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2:
input: X ′ ⊆ Xh output: Chh(X ′)
1 Initialize Y ← ∅;
2 Sort X ′ in descending order of utility per unit wage;
3 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,min{kh, |X ′|} do
4 add the ith contract in X ′ to Y ;
5 return Y ;
We can implement the mechanism to run inO(|X| log |X|) time by using heaps. Let us prepare
a min-heap with respect to each hospital’s utility per unit wage. We derive the time complexity
from an “amortized” analysis and can add a newly proposed contract x ∈ Xh to the heap for h in
O(log(|Xh|)) time. When a hospital h rejects a contract, we can delete it in O(log(|Xh|)) time.
Hence, the total time complexity is O(
∑
h∈H |Xh| log(|Xh|)) = O(|X| log(|X|)).
Let us illustrate this mechanism via an example.
Example 2. Consider a market with five doctors D = {d1, d2, d3, d4, d5} and two hospitals H =
{h1, h2}. The set of offered contracts is
X = {(d1, h1, 57), (d2, h1, 50), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h1, 50),
(d1, h2, 100), (d2, h2, 100), (d3, h2, 100), (d4, h2, 100), (d5, h2, 100)}.
12
Table 1: Utilities of hospitals and utilities per unit wage.
x ∈ Xh1 fh1 fh1/w x ∈ Xh2 fh2 fh2/w
(d1, h1, 57) 111 1.95 (d1, h2, 100) 50 0.50
(d2, h1, 50) 98 1.96 (d2, h2, 100) 30 0.30
(d3, h1, 42) 83 1.98 (d3, h2, 100) 20 0.20
(d4, h1, 55) 110 2.00 (d4, h2, 100) 10 0.10
(d5, h1, 50) 101 2.02 (d5, h2, 100) 40 0.40
Here, h1 offers the doctors wages from 42 to 57, while h2 offers each of them wage 100. We assume
that the preferences of the doctors are
d1 : (d1, h1, 57) d1 (d1, h2, 100),
d2 : (d2, h1, 50) d2 (d2, h2, 100),
d3 : (d3, h1, 42) d3 (d3, h2, 100),
d4 : (d4, h1, 55) d4 (d4, h2, 100),
d5 : (d5, h2, 100) d5 (d5, h1, 50).
The utilities of the hospitals are given in Table 1. Each hospital has a common fixed budget 100
(Bh1 = Bh2 = 100).
First, each doctor chooses her most preferred contract:
X ′ = {(d1, h1, 57), (d2, h1, 50), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h2, 100)}.
Since dBh1/wh1e = 3, Chh1(X ′) chooses the top three contracts according to the ranking of utili-
ties per unit wage shown in Table 1, which is, {(d4, h1, 55), (d3, h1, 42), (d2, h1, 50)}. In addition,
Chh2(X
′) chooses the top dBh2/wh2e = 1 contract, that is, {(d5, h2, 100)}.
Then, d1 chooses her second preferred contract,
X ′ = {(d1, h2, 100), (d2, h1, 50), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h2, 100)}.
Chh2(X
′) is {(d1, h2, 100)}, whose utility per unit wage is larger than (d5, h2, 100).
Next, d5 chooses her second preferred contract, i.e., (d5, h1, 50), whose utility per unit wage is
2.02. Since this is higher than the other contract in X ′h1 , (d2, h1, 50) is rejected. Thus, d2 chooses
her second preferred contract, (d2, h2, 100):
X ′ = {(d1, h2, 100), (d2, h2, 100), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h1, 50)}.
Chh2(X
′) = {(d1, h2, 100)}, since it has a higher utility per unit wage than (d2, h2, 100). Finally,
since d2 no longer has a preferred contract,
X ′ = {(d1, h2, 100), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h1, 50)}.
No contract is rejected and the mechanism terminates.
The choice function satisfies the following properties:
13
Lemma 1. For each hospital h, the choice function defined in Algorithm 2 is SUB, IRC, LAD, and
COM.
Proof. It is straightforward that the choice function is SUB, IRC, and LAD because it simply picks
at most the top min{kh, |X ′|} contracts. Next, let us turn to COM. Let X ′′ ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Xh. If
|X ′| ≤ kh, since the choice function picks all contracts in X ′, fh(Chh(X ′)) = fh(X ′) ≥ fh(X ′′)
clearly holds. On the other hand, if |X ′| > kh, since it picks kh contracts, we have wh(Chh(X ′)) ≥
wh · kh ≥ Bh. Thus, it is sufficient to claim that
fh(Chh(X
′)) ≥ fh(X ′′) if wh(X ′′) ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))
for any X ′′ ⊆ X ′ ⊆ X .
Since the choice function greedily pick kh contracts with respect to the utility per unit wage,
the chosen contracts yield the optimal utility of a fractional knapsack problem [8]. Also, to maxi-
mize the utility of hospital h with X ′′, we need to solve an integral knapsack problem. Therefore,
fh(Chh(X
′)) is at least
max
z∈[0,1]X′
{∑
x∈X′
fh(x) · zx |
∑
x∈X′
xW · zx ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))
}
≥ max
z∈{0,1}X′
{∑
x∈X′
fh(x) · zx |
∑
x∈X′
xW · zx ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))
}
= max
Y⊆X′
{∑
x∈Y
fh(x) |
∑
x∈Y
xW ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))
}
≥ fh(X ′′).
Note that the first inequality is derived from the fact that the optimal value of the fractional knapsack
problem is never worse than that of the integral one. Thus, the choice function Chh satisfies COM
and the proof is complete.
Next, we show the upper bound of the increment of the budgets. The following lemma clearly
holds from |Chh(X ′)| ≤ kh and xW ≤ wh for all x ∈ Xh.
Lemma 2. For each choice function defined in Algorithm 2 and a set of contracts X ′ ⊆ Xh, it
holds that
wh(Chh(X
′)) ≤ wh · kh (= wh · dBh/whe).
We summarize the above arguments in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 2 is
strategy-proof for doctors and produces a B′H-stable matching such that Bh ≤ B′h ≤ wh · kh for
any h ∈ H . In addition, the mechanism can be implemented to run in O(|X| log |X|) time.
Finally, we note that, this mechanism is almost tight as long as we use the choice functions that
satisfy LAD and COM.
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Theorem 4. For any wh, wh, and Bh (0 < wh ≤ wh ≤ Bh), there exists a set of contracts Xh and
an additive utility function fh : Xh → R+ such that any choice function Chh : 2Xh → 2Xh satisfies
Chh(X
′) > wh · (Bh − wh)/wh for some X ′ ⊆ Xh if Chh is LAD and COM.
Proof. Let k = bBh/whc, Xh = {x1, . . . , x2k}, and
xi =
{
(di, h, wh) (i = 1, . . . , k),
(di, h, wh) (i = k + 1, . . . , 2k),
fh(xi) =
{
wh (i = 1, . . . , k),
2 · wh (i = k + 1, . . . , 2k).
Since Chh is COM, Chh({x1, . . . , xk}) = {x1, . . . , xk} holds. Thus, we have |Chh(X ′h)| ≥ k if
{x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ X ′h ⊆ Xh because Chh is LAD. Let |Ch(Xh)∩ {x1, . . . , xk}| = s and |Ch(Xh)∩
{xk+1, . . . , x2k}| = t. Here, s + t ≥ k holds. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
Ch(Xh) = {x1, . . . , xs, xk+1, . . . , xk+t}.
If s ≥ wh/wh and t < k, Chh is not COM as fh(Ch(Xh)) < fh(X ′) and wh(Chh(Xh)) ≥
wh(X
′) for X ′ = {xdwh/whe+1, . . . , xs, xk+1, . . . , xk+t}. Thus, we have s < wh/wh or t = k. If
t = k, we obtain that
wh(Chh(Xh)) = wh · s+ wh · t ≥ wh · k = wh ·
⌊
Bh
wh
⌋
> wh ·
(
Bh
wh
− 1
)
≥ wh · Bh − wh
wh
.
On the other hand, if s < wh/wh, we get
wh(Chh(Xh)) = wh · s+ wh · t
≥ wh · k − (wh − wh) · s
> wh ·
⌊
Bh
wh
⌋
− (wh − wh) ·
wh
wh
≥ wh · Bh − wh
wh
.
5.2 Non-Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes a stable mechanism that is not strategy-proof, but improves the budget
bound, that is, this mechanism outputs a matchingX ′ that isB′H-stable whereB
′
h is at mostBh+wh
for any h ∈ H . This is the best possible bound from Theorem 1.
As with the first, the second choice function greedily picks the top min{kh, |X ′|} contracts.
However, kh is defined as min
{
k |∑ki=1 x(i) ≥ Bh}, where x(i) denotes the ith highest contract
with respect to the utility per unit wage. Formally, it is given as Algorithm 3.
Note that the running time is O(|X| log |X|), as with the first mechanism. Let us illustrate this
mechanism via an example.
Example 3. We consider a situation that is identical to Example 2 with the first two rounds the
same.
At the third round, when d5 chooses (d5, h1, 50),
X ′ = {(d1, h2, 100), (d2, h1, 50), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h1, 50)}.
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Algorithm 3:
input: X ′ ⊆ Xh output: Chh(X ′)
1 Initialize Y ← ∅;
2 Sort X ′ in descending order of utility per unit wage;
3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |X ′| do
4 let x be the ith contract in X ′;
5 if wh(Y ) < Bh then Y ← Y ∪ {x};
6 return Y ;
The number of contracts Chh1(X
′) chooses changes from three to two; the total wage of the first
two contracts for h1 (105) exceeds the budget limit of 100. Thus, (d2, h1, 50) and (d3, h1, 42) are
rejected.
Next, d2 and d3 choose their second preferred contracts, i.e., (d2, h2, 100) and (d3, h2, 100), but
these contracts are also rejected. Finally, since they no longer have preferred contracts,
X ′ = {(d1, h2, 100), (d4, h1, 55), (d5, h1, 50)}.
No contract is rejected and the mechanism terminates.
We show the properties that this mechanism satisfies below.
Lemma 3. For each hospital, the choice function defined in Algorithm 3 is SUB, IRC, and COM.
Proof. IRC clearly follows from the definition of the choice functions. Next, we claim that the
choice functions satisfy SUB. Let X ′′ ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Xh. By definition, the utility per unit wage of any
contract in Chh(X ′) (⊇ Chh(X ′) ∩ X ′′) is higher than that of any contract in X ′ \ Chh(X ′) (⊇
X ′′ \ Chh(X ′)). Hence, we can partition X ′′ into two subsets: H = Chh(X ′) ∩ X ′′ and L =
X ′′ \ Chh(X ′). Any contract in H has a higher utility per unit wage than any contract in L. When
Chh takes X ′′ as an input, it first picks all of the contracts in H and some contracts in L. Therefore,
we obtain Chh(X ′) ∩X ′′ ⊆ Chh(X ′′) and derive the SUB property:
X ′′ \ Ch(X ′′) ⊆ X ′′ \ (Chh(X ′) ∩X ′′) ⊆ X ′ \ Chh(X ′).
Finally, we prove COM. Let X ′ = {x(1), . . . , x(|X′|)} ⊆ Xh, where the contracts are arranged
in decreasing order of the utility per unit wage. If wh(X ′) ≤ Bh, then it is clear that Chh(X ′) = X ′
and fh(Chh(X ′)) ≥ fh(X ′′) hold for any X ′′ ⊆ X ′. Otherwise, let Chh(X ′) = {x(1), . . . , x(k)}.
Here,
wh({x(1), . . . , x(k−1)}) < Bh ≤ wh({x(1), . . . , x(k)})
holds. As described in Lemma 1, since the greedy solution Chh(X ′) is optimal, we have fh(Chh(X ′)) ≥
fh(X
′′) for any X ′′ ⊆ X ′ such that wh(X ′′) ≤ wh(Chh(X ′)). Thus, the lemma holds.
Demonstrating that Algorithm 3 does not satisfy LAD is straightforward. In Example 2, when
a set of contracts {(d2, h1, 50), (d3, h1, 42), (d4, h1, 55)} is given, the choice function chooses all
three contracts. Here, if (d1, h1, 57) is further added, it chooses only two contracts, specifically,
{(d1, h1, 57), (d2, h1, 50)}. Thus, the second mechanism fails to satisfy LAD.
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Lemma 4. For each choice function defined in Algorithm 3 and a set of contracts X ′ ⊆ Xh, it
holds that
wh(Chh(X
′)) < Bh + wh.
We summarize the results for our second mechanism follows:
Theorem 5. The generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 3 pro-
duces a set of contracts X ′ that is B′H-stable where Bh ≤ B′h < Bh + wh for any h ∈ H . In
addition, the mechanism can be implemented to run in O(|X| log |X|) time.
The following confirms that the mechanism is not strategy-proof. Consider a market with three
doctors D = {d1, d2, d3} and two hospitals H = {h1, h2}. The set of offered contracts is
X = {(d1, h1, 1), (d1, h2, 1), (d2, h1, 2), (d2, h2, 1), (d3, h1, 1), (d1, h3, 1)}.
The doctors’ preferences are given as follows:
d1 : (d1, h1, 1) d1 (d1, h2, 1),
d2 : (d2, h2, 1) d2 (d2, h1, 2),
d3 : (d3, h2, 1) d3 (d3, h1, 1).
The utility of each contract is given as follows:
fh1({(d1, h1, 1)}) = 1, fh1({(d2, h1, 2)}) = 10, fh1({(d3, h1, 1)}) = 1,
fh2({(d1, h2, 1)}) = 3, fh2({(d2, h2, 1)}) = 1, and fh2({(d3, h2, 1)}) = 2.
The budgets of hospitals h1 and h2 are Bh1 = 2 and Bh2 = 1, respectively.
For this market, our mechanism outputs a stable-matching X ′ = {(d1, h2, 1), (d2, h1, 2)}. On
the other hand, if d3 misreports his or her preference as (d3, h1, 1) ′d3 (d3, h2, 1), the outcome of
the mechanism is X ′′ = {(d1, h1, 1), (d2, h2, 1), (d3, h1, 1)}. Thus, the mechanism is not strategy-
proof since d3 has an incentive to misreport.
5.3 Non-Existence of Doctor-Optimal Stable Matchings
It is known that a doctor-optimal stable matching often fails to exist in matchings with distributional
constraints [20]. Unfortunately, this also holds in our matching problem, even if there is a stable
matching that exactly satisfies the budget constraints. To illustrate this, let us consider a market with
four doctors D = {d1, d2, d3, d4} and two hospitals H = {h1, h2}. The set of offered contracts is
X = {(d1, h1, 1), (d2, h1, 2), (d3, h1, 1), (d4, h1, 1), (d3, h2, 1), (d4, h2, 1)}.
Suppose that the doctors’ preferences are
d1 : (d1, h1, 1),
d2 : (d2, h1, 2),
d3 : (d3, h1, 1) d3 (d3, h2, 1), and
d4 : (d4, h2, 1) d4 (d4, h1, 1).
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The utility of each contract is
fh1({(d1, h1, 1)}) = 7, fh1({(d2, h1, 2)}) = 6, fh1({(d3, h1, 1)}) = 1, fh1({(d4, h1, 1)}) = 4,
fh2({(d3, h2, 1)}) = 2, and fh2({(d4, h2, 1)}) = 1.
The budgets of hospitals h1 and h2 are Bh1 = 2 and Bh2 = 1, respectively.
For this market, our mechanisms output a stable matchingX ′ = {(d1, h1, 1), (d3, h2, 1), (d4, h1, 1)}
that exactly satisfies the budget constraints. The matching clearly improves without hurting any-
one if d3 and d4 exchange their positions. Since d3 prefers h1 to h2 and d4 prefers h2 to h1, they
unanimously prefer another stable matching X ′′ = {(d1, h1, 1), (d3, h1, 1), (d4, h2, 1)}.
5.4 Two Special Cases
This section examines two special hospital utilities cases. First, we assume that each hospital has
utility over a set of contracts that is proportional to the total amount of wages. Formally, for every
h ∈ H , X ′ ∈ Xh, and a constant γh(> 0),
fh(X
′) = γh · wh(X ′)
holds. In this case, we can make the second mechanism strategy-proof without sacrificing the
budget bound although stable matching may not exist as in Example 1. Specifically, we modify
Algorithm 3 to i) sort X ′ in increasing order of wage, instead of decreasing order of utility per unit
wage; ii) pick the contracts in order while keeping the total wage less than Bh; and iii) add the
contract with the highest wage unless it is already chosen. Formally, we define this as Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4:
input: X ′ ⊆ Xh output: Chh(X ′)
1 Initialize Y ← ∅;
2 Sort X ′ in increasing order of wages;
3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |X ′| − 1 do
4 let x be the ith contract in X ′;
5 if wh(Y ∪ {x}) < Bh then Y ← Y ∪ {x};
6 add the |X ′|th contract (highest wage contract) to Y ;
7 return Y ;
Lemma 5. For each hospital h, the choice function defined in Algorithm 4 is SUB, IRC, LAD, and
COM.
Proof. Let X ′ be {x(1), . . . , x(|X′|)} ⊆ Xh such that x(1)W < · · · < x(|X
′|)
W and let k be the largest
integer that satisfies
∑k
i=1 x
(i)
W < Bh and k ≤ |X ′| − 1. Also, let X ′′ be a subset of X ′ that contains
s (= |X ′′|) contracts, that is, X ′′ = {x(j1), . . . , x(js)} such that 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < js ≤ |X ′|. Let k′
be the largest integer that satisfies
∑k′
i=1 x
(ji)
W < Bh and k
′ ≤ s− 1. Then, we have k′ ≤ k ≤ jk′ by
x
(i)
W ≤ x(ji)W for all i.
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From this setup, we obtain
Chh(X
′) ∩X ′′ = {x(1), . . . , x(k), x(|X′|)} ∩ {x(j1), . . . , x(js)}
⊆ {x(j1), . . . , x(jk′ ), x(js)} = Chh(X ′′),
which is equivalent to the SUB condition. We also obtain
|Chh(X ′′)| = k′ + 1 ≤ k + 1 = |Chh(X ′)|,
which implies that Chh is LAD. Furthermore, the fact that the choice function for h satisfies SUB
and LAD simultaneously implies IRC.
Finally, we prove COM. First, let us consider a matching X ′ whose total wages for hospital h
is less than or equal to Bh, i.e., wh(X ′) ≤ Bh. In this case, since the choice function picks all
contracts in X ′, we have
fh(Chh(X
′)) = fh(X ′) = max{fh(X ′′′) | X ′′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′′) ≤ Bh}.
Second, let us consider a matching X ′ whose total wages for hospital h is greater than Bh, i.e.,
wh(X
′) > Bh. In this case, wh(Chh(X ′)) ≥ Bh holds by the definition. Hence, we have
fh(Chh(X
′)) = max{fh(X ′′′) | X ′′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′′) ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))}.
Thus, Chh is COM.
Lemma 6. For each choice function defined in Algorithm 4 and a set of contracts X ′ ⊆ Xh, it
holds that
wh(Chh(X
′)) < Bh + wh.
Proof. As in the proof for Lemma 5, let X ′ be {x(1), . . . , x(|X′|)} ⊆ Xh such that x(1)W < · · · <
x
(|X′|)
W and let k be the largest integer that satisfies
∑k
i=1 x
(i)
W ≤ Bh and k ≤ |X ′| − 1. Then, we
have
wh(Chh(X
′)) = wh({x(1), . . . , x(k)}) + wh({x(|X′|)}) < Bh + wh.
Thus, wh(Chh(X ′)) < Bh + wh holds for any h ∈ H .
From these two lemmas, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 4 is
strategy-proof for doctors and produces a B′H-stable matching such that Bh ≤ B′h < Bh + wh for
any h ∈ H when each hospital has utility over a set of contracts that is proportional to the total
amount of wages.
We further examine what happens if we give up strategy-proofness. We can construct a stable
mechanism that may increase the budget by a factor of up to one-half. This bound improves the
previous bound when the maximum wage wh is larger than Bh/2. We here modify Algorithm 3 to
i) sort X ′ in increasing order of wage; ii) pick the contract with the highest wage; and iii) pick the
remaining contracts in order while keeping the total wage less than 1.5Bh. Formally, we define this
modification as Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5:
input: X ′ ⊆ Xh output: Chh(X ′)
1 Initialize Y ← ∅;
2 Sort X ′ in increasing order of wages;
3 add the |X ′|th contract (highest wage contract) to Y ;
4 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |X ′| − 1 do
5 let x be the ith contract in X ′;
6 if wh(Y ∪ {x}) < 1.5 ·Bh then Y ← Y ∪ {x};
7 return Y ;
Lemma 7. The generalized DA with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 5 is SUB, IRC, and
COM.
Proof. IRC is evident by the definition of the choice function.
Let X ′ = {x(1), . . . , x(|X′|)} ⊆ Xh such that x(1)W < · · · < x(|X
′|)
W and let k be the largest integer
that satisfies x|X
′|
W +
∑k
i=1 x
(i)
W < 1.5 ·Bh and k ≤ |X ′| − 1. Also, let X ′′ = {x(j1), . . . , x(js)} ⊆ X ′
such that 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < js ≤ |X ′| and let k′ be the largest index that satisfies xjsW +
∑k′
i=1 x
(ji)
W <
1.5 ·Bh and k′ ≤ s− 1. We then have k ≤ jk′ by x(i)W ≤ x(ji)W . Chh is SUB because
Chh(X
′) ∩X ′′ = {x(1), . . . , x(k), x(|X′|)} ∩ {x(j1), . . . , x(js)}
⊆ {x(j1), . . . , x(jk′ ), x(js)} = Chh(X ′′).
We next claim that Chh is COM. Let t satisfy that
x
(1)
W < · · · < x(t)W ≤ 1/2 < x(t+1)W < · · · < x(|X
′|)
W .
We consider the following three cases.
Case 1: |Chh(X ′) ∩ {x(t+1), . . . , x(|X′|)}| ≥ 2. In this case, since wh(Chh(X ′)) > 2 ·Bh/2 = Bh,
we have
fh(Chh(X
′)) = max{fh(X ′′′) | X ′′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′′) ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))}.
Case 2: k < t. In this case, since wh(Chh(X ′)) + wh({x(t)}) > 1.5 ·Bh, we have
wh(Chh(X
′)) > 1.5 ·Bh − wh({x(t)}) ≥ Bh.
Thus, it holds that
fh(Chh(X
′)) = max{fh(X ′′′) | X ′′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′′) ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))}.
Case 3: k ≥ t and |Chh(X ′) ∩ {x(t+1), . . . , x(|X′|)}| ≤ 1. As x(|X′|) ∈ Chh(X ′), we have k = t
and |Chh(X ′) ∩ {x(t+1), . . . , x(|X′|)}| = 1. If wh(Chh(X ′)) ≥ Bh, we have
fh(Chh(X
′)) = max{fh(X ′′′) | X ′′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′′) ≤ wh(Chh(X ′))}.
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Thus, we assume that wh(Chh(X ′)) < Bh. In this case, we obtain
fh(Chh(X
′)) = max{fh(X ′′′) | X ′′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′′) ≤ Bh}
because |X ′′′ ∩ {x(t+1), . . . , x(|X′|)}| ≤ 1 holds for any X ′′′ ⊆ X ′ such that wh(X ′′′) ≤ Bh.
The proof is thus complete.
Lemma 8. For each choice function defined in Algorithm 5 and a set of contracts X ′ ⊆ Xh, it
holds that
wh(Chh(X
′)) ≤ 1.5 ·Bh.
This lemma is obvious by the definition of the choice functions. Thus, Bh ≤ B′h ≤ 1.5 · Bh
holds for any h ∈ H .
We summarize the above arguments in the following theorem:
Theorem 7. The generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 5 pro-
duces a B′H-stable matching such that Bh ≤ B′h ≤ 1.5 ·Bh for any h ∈ H when each hospital has
utility over a set of contracts that is proportional to the total amount of wages.
Second, we consider the case in which each hospital has the same utility across contracts.
Formally, for every h, X ′ ⊆ Xh and a constant γh(> 0),
fh(X
′) = γh · |X ′|
holds. In this case, we obtain a strategy-proof mechanism that always produces a conventional
stable matching, which never violates the given budget constraints. The choice function greedily
chooses contracts in an increasing order of wage until just before the total wage of the chosen
contracts exceeds the constraint.
Algorithm 6:
input: X ′ ⊆ Xh output: Chh(X ′)
1 Initialize Y ← ∅;
2 Sort X ′ in increasing order of wages;
3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |X ′| do
4 let x be the ith contract in X ′;
5 if wh(Y ∪ {x}) ≤ Bh then Y ← Y ∪ {x};
6 return Y ;
Theorem 8. The generalized DA with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 6 is strategy-proof
and produces a stable matching.
Proof. Since the choice functions greedily choose contracts in increasing order of wages, we have
|Chh(X ′)| = max{|X ′′| | X ′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′) ≤ Bh}
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for all h and X ′ ⊆ Xh. In other words,
Chh(X
′) ∈ arg max{fh(X ′′) | X ′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′′) ≤ Bh}
holds. Thus, for each h andX ′ ⊆ Xh, Chh(X ′) picks the smallest max{|X ′′| | X ′′ ⊆ X ′, wh(X ′) ≤
Bh} contracts according to the wage. Therefore, each Chh satisfies SUB, IRC, and LAD, and hence
the mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors. Also, the mechanism clearly produces a BH-feasible
set of contracts.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined matching with budget constraints, introduced a concept of near-feasible
matchings, and proposed two novel mechanisms that return a stable matching in polynomial time:
one is strategy-proof and the other is not. Furthermore, we derived the increment bound of the
budgets. Notably, the best possible bound is obtained by sacrificing strategy-proofness.
While one might think that we could handle budget constraints together with maximum quota
constraints, it is not a simple process to design an appropriate choice function that handles both
constraints simultaneously. Suppose, for example, that a hospital has a maximum quota of one and
offers two contracts, one with a lower wage than the other. The hospital has lower utility for the
high wage contract than the low wage one and, conversely, it has higher utility per unit wage for the
former than the latter. Thus, the unique stable matching admits the low wage contract only. If the
choice function additionally checks whether the current number of chosen contracts exceeds the
maximum quota in line 5 in Algorithm 3, it chooses the low wage contract and fails to provide
the stable matching. In general, this problem is known as a cardinality constrained knapsack
problem [7, 23]. The question remains whether, building upon techniques for this problem, we
can construct a proper choice function.
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